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Executive Summary:  
The NAV discount is a long standing puzzle in the listed real estate context. In this paper 
we extend the existing literature’s rational and noise trader explanations by exploring 
the influence of specific irrational behaviors. Based on behavioral biases identified in the 
stock and real estate markets, we hypothesize the existence of a relationship between 
lagged NAV growth and the NAV discount. The findings provide initial evidence of trend-
chasing behavior between the dual real estate markets. The results have broader 
implications for the perception of the relationship between public and private real estate 
markets. 
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A Behavioral Interpretation of the NAV Discount Puzzle 
in Listed Real Estate Companies 
 
1. Introduction  
The net asset value (NAV) discount is not just an academic puzzle. Persistent differences 
between public and private market valuations influence decisions to privatise listed real 
estate companies. Understanding the NAV discount puzzle is also crucial for investment 
strategies attempting to time the market. Yet, despite the importance of the topic, existing 
research is unable to fully account for the NAV discount puzzle (See, for example, Pattitoni, 
Petracci, & Spisni, 2013).  
The majority of existing NAV discount studies assumes that the public market is more 
efficient than the private market. The price/information transmission mechanism 
literature largely emphasises the process from public to private markets (see, for 
example, Gyourko & Keim, 1992; Yavas & Yildirim, 2011). The perspective is reflected in 
the development of so-called ‘pure property’ indices, which attempt to use the valuation 
of REIT shares to uncover real time valuation of the underlying property (Geltner, 2015). 
Nonetheless, it does not necessarily rule out a relationship in the opposite direction. 
Some recent studies suggest the possibility of a two-way interaction between the public 
and private real estate market. For example, real estate investment decisions by 
institutional investors are found to be affected by the sentiment of private real estate 
investors in the US market (Das, Freybote, & Marcato, 2015; Freybote & Seagraves, 2017). 
There seems to be a sentiment spill-over between the private and public real estate 
markets.  Specifically, the release of a series of good NAV figures, if interpreted as positive 
REIT sentiment by institutional investors, may drive institution REIT investments. This 
may lead public market participants to overact to their perceived trend in the private 
market.  
Following this line of research, we adopt a broader perspective than the traditional 
account of information transmission in NAV discount studies.  We develop a framework 
that allows the public market to lag behind the private market. This is achieved by 
considering the characteristics of the real estate market from a behavioral perspective 
and drawing on the relevant findings from the stock market. Recently, behavioral 
approaches have become increasingly popular in a variety of research disciplines. 
However, the potential contribution of such an approach to the NAV discount puzzle in 
listed real estate companies remains unexplored. The peculiarities of real estate are 
widely acknowledged to affect the efficiency of the market and its susceptibility to 
irrational behaviour (Bao & Li, 2016; Bao & Meng, 2017; Wang & Hui, 2017). Within this 
context, a behavioral perspective emerges as a natural extension to existing explanations 
for the NAV discount puzzle. 
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We derive hypotheses that demonstrate the extension from the general ideas of rational 
and noise trader models, towards the more focused approach adopted in this study. The 
formulation of the hypotheses, specifically based on what is known about particular 
behaviors in the real estate context, is hoped to be able to provide the additional detail 
necessary to accommodate the unexplained variation in the NAV discount.  The 
hypotheses also imply an alternative direction of causality between the public and private 
real estate markets to the traditional public-to-private assumption. Support for the 
hypotheses could potentially have broader implications for conceptualising the 
relationship between the public and private market. The hypotheses are tested by a 
behavioural extension of the model in Clayton and MacKinnon (2002). Using UK real 
estate market data between 2002 and 2017, we find general support to our hypotheses. 
Our analysis suggests causality from information in private real estate market to public 
real estate market.  
The remainder of this paper sets out the investigation and discusses the results in more 
detail. Section 2 introduces the existing literature on the NAV discount debate. Section 3 
considers the relevance of the behavioral perspective and justifies the selection of specific 
behavioral explanations as the hypotheses to be tested. The econometric methods 
adopted and the data employed are discussed in Section 4, followed by the presentation 
and discussion of results in Sections 5 and 6. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
Attempts to explain the NAV discount in both financial asset and real estate markets can 
be organised into two schools of thought; the ‘rational’ approach and the ‘noise trader’ 
approach.  
Rational Explanations  
The rational approach attempts to explain the NAV discount by reference to the different 
characteristics of direct and indirect investment (Cherkes, Sagi, & Stanton, 2009; Malkiel, 
1995). According to traditional discounted cash flow methodology, the different prices 
recorded in the public and private market reflect differences in the level and risk of cash 
flows investors expect to receive. For instance, greater liquidity in the public market over 
the private market, and the consequent reduction in liquidity risk premium, is 
hypothesised to increase the value of indirect investment (Benveniste, Capozza, & Seguin, 
2001; Cheung, Chung, & Fung, 2015). This approach also argues that firm-level 
differences can influence the NAV discount. For example, high management fees may be 
interpreted as a principal-agent problem, leading firms with high management fees to 
have larger discounts (Capozza & Korean, 1995; Lenkey, 2015).   
Barkham and Ward (1999) investigate a comprehensive set of rational hypotheses for 
listed property discounts for UK property companies, including the effect on the NAV 
discount from management expenses, leverage, inside ownership, outstanding tax 
burden, size, and firm reputation. They find strong evidence that the NAV discount 
becomes more negative with increasing tax liability. The result is explained on the basis 
that taxes represent the state’s claim on the firm’s assets, diminishing the value 
retrievable by investors. They also find support for the hypothesis that increased 
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leverage is associated with more negative NAV discounts, which is explained in terms of 
increased equity risk. Similar results are found in other research (Clayton & MacKinnon, 
2001; Morri, McAllister, & Ward, 2005). 
Despite the clear intuition and evidence for specific rational hypotheses, there are several 
flaws with the approach. Particular criticism has focused on the methodology employed 
in the tests and the narrow emphasis on individual hypotheses. Many studies fail to 
explain each factor’s relative strength and the complex interrelationship with other 
factors (Rehkugler, Schindler, & Zajonz, 2012). The lack of stability in the results 
generated by alternative specifications supports the view that conclusions from 
incomplete models are likely to be misleading (Morri et al., 2005). A further problem for 
the rational approach arises from the identification of a significant market NAV discount 
variable. Morri et al. (2005) highlight that while firm-level NAV deviations are explained 
by market NAV deviation, there is no explanation for the cause of the common NAV 
deviation.  
The methodological issues are compounded by the inconclusive explanations that can be 
invoked to account for the findings. For several variables, there is no clear direction that 
the rational hypothesis should take. Depending on the researcher’s perspective, it is 
possible to argue that it is rational for a particular characteristic to either increase or 
decrease the NAV discount. For instance, on the one hand, management expenses can be 
viewed as a proxy for managerial ability, which indicates a smaller, less negative, NAV 
discount; on the other hand, expenses can be viewed as additional fee associated with 
indirect investment and potentially a source of agency costs, which leads to a larger, more 
negative, NAV discount. Similarly, Brounen and Laak (2005) and Clayton and MacKinnon 
(2001) identify a negative relationship between firm size and the NAV discount, 
attributing the finding to greater access to capital and investment opportunities. 
However, Barkham and Ward (1999) and Bond and Shilling (2003) find evidence of the 
opposite relationship, arguing instead that this represents greater liquidity costs arising 
from the distortion in market supply on asset liquidation. Interpretations risk being 
chosen ex-post to fit findings.  
Noise Trader Explanations 
The rational approach has been challenged by an alternative perspective, emphasising 
the role of sentiment. This is based on a closed-end fund application of the noise trader 
model from De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990). The model assumes two 
types of traders exist: rational and noise traders. Other critical assumptions include: (1) 
noise trader sentiment is unpredictable; (2) rational investors have relatively short time 
horizons; (3) noise trader sentiment is systematic. The model predicts that prices diverge 
from fundamental values, with NAV discounts reflecting additional noise trader risk.  
Investigations employing a variety of methodologies have generated support for the role 
of sentiment in asset pricing and the NAV discount (See, for example, Baker & Wurgler, 
2006; C. M. C. Lee, A. Shleifer, & R. H. Thaler, 1991). As early literature identified high 
correlations between returns on real estate funds and small-cap stocks (Glascock, Lu, & 
So, 2000), and based on the assumption that individual investors dominate the small-cap 
stock market, one may expect that the sentiment of individual investors is driving the 
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performance of real estate investments. Later real estate research has directly 
incorporated a proxy for investor sentiment into the NAV discount model. For example, 
Barkham and Ward (1999) employ the CBI industrial confidence index and the MMI 
inflation expectations, and identify a significant role of sentiment in the UK. Morri and 
Baccarin (2016) provide further evidence for the ‘noise trader’ hypothesis by introducing 
an appraisal reduction coefficient as the measurement of sentiment in their models. 
While mainstream economics in general has relaxed the restrictive assumptions of 
rationality, the noise trader explanation has been criticised on the basis of its treatment 
of irrationality (Ramiah, Xu, & Moosa, 2015). In C. Lee, A. Shleifer, and R. H. Thaler (1991), 
individual investors are assumed to generate the noisy fluctuations that lead to NAV 
discounts. However, this has been challenged by a number of other studies. Chen, Kan, 
and Miller (1993) provide an initial critique, identifying instability in the relationship 
between the closed-end fund discount and ownership structure, and concluding that the 
findings of C. Lee et al. (1991) cannot be generalised.  Elton, Gruber, and Busse (1998) 
also dispute the idea that the existence of discounts can be attributed to additional risk 
from noise traders. The authors find that the influence of the proxy for sentiment is not 
significantly different across the portfolio categories, and that sentiment is not behind the 
price behavior of closed-end funds.  
In addition to the evidence against the noise trader hypothesis in general, its application 
to the real estate market appears to be especially vulnerable to criticism. The peculiarities 
of real estate, particularly in relation to the operational burdens, means that it is common 
to outsource real estate expertise, even for institutional investors. Institutional 
ownership of US equity REITs increased from 14.14% in 1990 to 75.19% in 2011 (An, Wu, 
& Wu, 2015). Thus, it is not clear whether the players in the market can be expected to 
show the purported irrationality. 
From surveying the literature, it is apparent that neither the rational nor noise trader 
approaches are infallible, nor are they capable of fully accounting for the puzzling 
existence of the NAV discount. In this paper, we bridge this gap in the literature by 
adopting a nuanced perspective of market participants’ irrational behaviors to account 
for the market-wide NAV discount movements that currently remain unexplained. 
3. Theoretical Framework and Testable Hypotheses  
The noise trader approach represents an initial application of behavioral ideas in 
explanations for the NAV discount puzzle. However, while the approach relaxes the 
assumption of perfect rationality, it is limited to measurement of noise trading only.  
Contrasting with the reliance on a single catch-all sentiment measure, the behavioral 
literature outside the NAV discount debate emphasises not only the tendency to be 
affected by sentiment, but also why this occurs and how this impacts behavior (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1974). A variety of specific biases and heuristics have been identified, 
including, inter alia, loss aversion, availability bias, optimism bias, anchoring effect, 
conservatism and representativeness bias. A disaggregate approach, focusing on specific 
biases, has the potential to provide a better understanding of the mechanisms behind the 
NAV discount. In this section we derive hypotheses by considering the characteristics of 
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the real estate market from a behavioral perspective and drawing on the relevant formal 
theories from the stock market behavioral literature. 
According to the weak form of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, past performance should 
not be able to predict future performance. However, investment strategies based on 
historical performance and fundamental data have identified profitable opportunities in 
the market. For example, De Bondt and Thaler (1985) use stocks from the top and bottom 
decile of preceding three-year performance to form ‘winner’ and ‘loser’ portfolios 
respectively, and identify substantial positive returns from the ‘loser’ strategy. This 
indicates market overreaction to past trends and a subsequent reversal. Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993) further explore the short-term momentum effect by constructing 
portfolios based on stocks’ past six-month performance. They find that the ‘winner’ 
portfolio outperforms the ‘loser’ portfolio over the next six-months.  On the other hand, 
there is evidence to suggest that the market exhibits underreaction to isolated corporate 
events (Bernard & Thomas, 1990; Ikenberry & Ramnath, 2002; Kadiyala & Rau, 2004). 
Several traits identified in psychological studies also support the existence of 
underreaction. For instance, anchoring bias refers to the tendency for agents to adjust 
their beliefs only marginally from expectations in the prior period. Chen et al. (1993) find 
evidence for anchoring in the incorporation of information into stock market analyst 
forecasts, with forecasts adjusting slowly despite the provision of new information.  
Theoretical contributions have sought to accommodate the empirical findings which 
suggest the co-existence of over and underreaction. Daniel, Hirshleifer, and 
Subrahmanyam (1998) provide an explanation based upon investor overconfidence and 
biased self-attribution. Short term momentum is driven primarily from overreaction to 
short term information (the result of overconfidence) and trends (the result of self-
attribution bias). Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) offer an alternative explanation 
based upon representativeness (trend following) and conservatism (mean-reversion). In 
the model, investors are uncertain which ‘regime’ – trend or mean-reversion – is in 
operation at any point in time, and players’ beliefs regarding the prevailing regime are 
influenced by past experience. To the extent that the investor considers that the mean 
reverting regime applies, they underreact to information. Alternatively, belief in the 
trending regime means that they overact to information (Shefrin, 2013). 
Further nuances have been identified in relation to the symmetry of responses to positive 
and negative trends. Easterwood and Nutt (1999) find evidence of generalised optimism, 
which is a tendency for overreaction to be greater when responding to good news. In the 
context of trend extrapolation, generalised optimism suggests that past rising trends may 
trigger greater overreaction than past falling trends. Additional research has also 
considered the nature of the information itself. Daniel and Titman (2006) argue that 
linking over extrapolation to overconfidence implies an emphasis on ‘soft’ information as 
opposed to fundamental information.  
Based on these findings from the stock market context, it remains to be investigated 
whether analogous under and overreaction behavior can provide the missing piece in the 
explanations for the NAV discount puzzle in real estate sector. The complexity of decision-
making in the real estate context and the demands placed on investor cognition may lead 
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to the adoption of effort-saving heuristics and biases (Geltner, G., Clayton, & Eichholtz, 
2013). In this already convoluted context, the rise of Big Data has generated yet more 
information for investors to absorb. It follows that research into the concept of salience 
has become particularly relevant (Andreassen, 1990; Brown & Matysiak, 2000; Jandl, 
2015). A range of factors have been considered to affect the salience of information, 
including inter alia, timing, presentation, and availability of alternatives (Andreassen, 
1990; Bordalo, Gennaioli, & Shleifer, 2015). A compelling result for the real estate context 
concerns the effect of perceived trends (Andreassen & Kraus, 1990). Evidence of the 
association between salience and trends already exists in a variety of real estate settings. 
Cities which have experienced rapid house price increases in the past are found to be 
associated with higher expectations of future house price rises than is expected 
elsewhere (Case & Shiller, 1988). Evidence from the real estate development industry 
indicates that even professionals in the real estate market may be enticed by trends and 
exhibit habit persistence (Antwi & Henneberry, 1995). 
In a further extension, it is suggested that trends accompanied by an explanation for the 
trend are more prone to generate anti-regressive behavior (Wameryd, 2001). In 
particular, there is evidence to support the media’s role in influencing the market via the 
dissemination of explanations and beliefs regarding investment performance (Tetlock, 
2007). Given the fundamental importance of the property market to the economy, and 
the media attention it attracts, this appears to raise the possibility of trend following 
behavior in the real estate market. There are empirical evidence from real estate markets 
to support such a notion (See, for example, DeCoster & Strange, 2012).    
Focusing on the public market response to fundamental information from the private 
market, we hypothesise a relationship between NAV growth and NAV discount, whereby 
trend following behavior in relation to past NAV growth influences the current NAV 
discount.  It is noted that while NAV growth could be regarded as a fundamental 
accounting measure, thus falling foul of the tangible/intangible distinction raised by 
Daniel and Titman (2006), the imprecise nature of NAV estimates distinguishes the 
variable from other fundamentals. Consequently, there is arguably a greater opportunity 
for investor interpretation and biases to be introduced. Our hypotheses are as follows: 
Hypothesis I:  Market underreaction to isolated NAV changes. This will lead to 
movement in the NAV discount in the opposite direction to the growth 
in NAV. Positive (negative) past NAV growth will not generate 
sufficiently positive (negative) changes in share price and will lead to 
more (less) negative NAV discounts.  
Hypothesis II: Market overreaction to runs of high NAV growth. This will lead to 
movement in the NAV discount in the same direction as growth in NAV. 
Runs of past NAV growth will generate excessively positive changes in 
share price and will lead to less negative NAV discounts. 
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4. Data and Methods 
The framework adopted is based on the market NAV discount model developed by 
Clayton and MacKinnon (2002), which expresses the NAV discount as a linear function of 
three variables: present value of growth opportunities, liquidity, and sentiment.  
𝑁𝐴𝑉 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 =  𝑐 + 𝛽1(𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠) +  𝛽2(𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦) +  𝛽3(𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) + 𝑒𝑡     
The growth opportunities and liquidity variables represent the rational explanations for 
the NAV discount at the market level (Rational Explanations). The variables reflect that 
according to the rational approach, cash flows from public real estate can be 
distinguished from private real estate on the basis of shares being freely tradable (i.e. 
liquidity variable) and the potential value added by the skills and market power of listed 
real estate companies (i.e. growth opportunities variable). The sentiment variable 
represents the noise trader hypothesis (Noise Trader Explanations).  
In the estimation of the model, Clayton and MacKinnon (2002) adopt a market-wide 
approach in order to avoid the issues with the early firm-level investigations. The 
infrequency of appraisals is the primary limitation of the firm-level approach. Capozza 
and Korean (2009) attempt to overcome this constraint by using a weighted 
capitalisation rate to capitalise property income. However, their weightings are 
determined according to average property value in the metropolitan area for each asset, 
which fails to take into account property idiosyncrasies and results in a loss of precision. 
The use of a market-wide NAV index provides an alternative method to mitigate the 
infrequency of appraisals as it incorporates a wider distribution of appraisal dates from 
all firms in the market.  
An additional advantage of adopting a market-wide perspective is the reduction in 
appraiser error. While, for example, the RICS Red Book provides guidance for UK valuers, 
the guide is largely procedural and there remains scope for errors in appraisal inputs 
(Barkham & Ward, 1999). A market-level approach enables a reduction in unsystematic 
error, in addition to reducing systematic error from individual appraiser’s biases of 
valuing too high/low (Geltner, 1993; Liow, 1996). It is also possible to justify the market-
level perspective from the finding that the NAV discount is a market-wide phenomenon 
and the market discount is a significant explanatory factor in firm-level estimations 
(Morri et al., 2005).  
Despite the benefits of a market-wide approach, there is a notable absence of market-
level investigations into the NAV discount for the UK market despite its size and 
significance in the global listed real estate universe. In order to redress this research 
deficiency, this paper’s behavioral extension of the Clayton and MacKinnon (2002) 
framework is conducted using UK data for the period from May 2002 to March 20172. 
Table 1 gives data sources, variable definitions, and descriptive statistics of our data.  
                                                          
2 Although EPRA’s NAV discount data is available from 1989, the data for Equity Offerings has zero values 
between February and April in 2002. Subsequently, we treat these zero values as outliers and the sampling 
period starts from May 2002 for the sake of consistency. 
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The FTSE EPRA/NAREIT UK Index provides the monthly NAV discount data for the UK 
listed market (NAVD). We performed Unit Root test (i.e., ADF and PP tests) to check series 
stationarity. The results suggest that NAVD is stationary in our sampling period.  We 
include two measurements as the Rational Explanations variables. Growth opportunities 
in the public market are approximated using the market value of equity offerings (EQ). 
The liquidity variable is derived from private market transaction volume data (TRANS) 
collected by HMRC.  The sentiment variable representing the Noise Trader Explanations 
is captured by an Business Confidence Index (BCI) for the UK market.  
To test Hypothesis I, we include a lagged term of NAV growth (NAVG) to capture the effect 
of past NAV growth on NAV discount. To test Hypothesis II, we introduce a dummy 
variable ABOVE to indicate the presence of a series of above average NAV growth, and 
then create interaction terms between ABOVE and NAVG to test for evidence of 
overreaction to growth information following a run of high growth.  
We also included a range of control variables. Specifically, to investigate the pure effect 
of NAV growth on NAV discount, it is necessary to control for public market performance. 
A common practice in the literature is to use past return to represent market 
performance (e.g. Daniel and Titman, 2006). We follow the convention by using the 
lagged return rate of the EPRA/NAREIT index (REIT) to controls for past public market 
performance.  We also include interest rate (INT), GDP growth (GDP), and monthly return 
rate of FTSE (FTSE) are included to control for macroeconomic influences. 
We run a Pairwise Granger Causality Test between NAV discount and NAV growth to 
check the presence and nature of causality between NAV discount and NAV growth. The 
test results suggest a bi-directional causality between the series, and consequently a 
vector autoregression (VAR) specification. The VAR approach provides the appropriate 
framework for accommodating statistical complexity and feedback effects, without the 
informational demands of a long-term structural model (Li, Mooradian, & Yang, 2009).  
Before estimating the econometric model, some initial investigations provide general 
evidence in support of the hypotheses. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the NAV discount 
and NAV growth series over the sampling period. The co-movement of the two series in 
the time series plot is indicative of a relationship between the variables. . Stationarity 
tests identify both the NAV discount and NAV growth series as I(0), leading to the 
rejection of co-integration between the variables.  
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Figure 1. NAV discount and NAV growth (May 2002 – March 2017) 
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Table 1. Data Source, Variable Definitions, and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable/Proxy 
Var. 
Name 
Definitions Data Sources Mean SD Min  Max 
D
ep
. V
ar
.  
NAV discount NAVD 
Percentage difference between NAV and stock market 
index valuation 
(Share price / NAV per share) – 1 
(monthly)  
 
FTSE 
EPRA/NAREIT UK 
 
-0.1505 0.1264 -0.5103 0.1158 
R
at
io
n
al
 
E
xp
la
n
at
io
n
s Monthly equity 
offering 
EQ 
Monthly GBP worth of real estate equity offerings 
(monthly) (million) 
SNL 199.3789 350.8344 0.0000 2210.867 
Change in 
property 
transaction  
TRANS 
Number of non-residential property transactions 
(monthly) (first differenced) 
HMRC 0.0005 0.1379 -0.3510 0.4206 
N
o
is
e 
T
ra
d
er
 
E
xp
la
n
at
io
n
s 
Business 
Confidence 
BCI 
Index of business confidence ( monthly, long term 
average = 1)  
 
OECD 
 
1.0011 0.0113 0.9606 1.0190 
F
o
cu
se
d
 
B
eh
av
io
u
ra
l 
E
xp
la
n
at
io
n
s 
Monthly NAV 
growth NAVG Monthly growth rate of NAV (monthly) 
FTSE 
EPRA/NAREIT UK 
0.0017 0.0248 -0.1586 0.0422 
Run of above 
average NAV 
growth 
ABOVE 
= 1 if two immediately prior months record above 
average NAV growth, and 0 otherwise 
FTSE 
EPRA/NAREIT UK 
0.6232 0.4858 0.0000 1.0000 
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
 
Monthly 
FTSE/NAREIT 
return 
REIT Monthly return on FTSE/NAREIT UK index (monthly) 
FTSE 
EPRA/NAREIT UK 
0.0026 0.0597 -0.2889 0.2222 
Interest rate INT Gross redemption yields on 10 year gilts (monthly)  Bank of England 0.0367 0.0134 0.0067 0.0580 
Annual GDP 
growth 
GDP 
Growth rate of GDP (2016 prices, interpolated into 
monthly data)  
Office of National 
Statistics 
0.0014 0.0022 -0.0094 0.0076 
Monthly FTSE 
return 
FTSE Monthly return on FTSE 100 index (monthly) SNL 0.0003 0.0403 -0.1395 0.0830 
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5. Empirical Findings 
We use the following specification in Clayton and MacKinnon (2002) with an AR(1) term 
of NAVD as the benchmark model (labelled as Model 0).  
𝑁𝐴𝑉𝐷𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑁𝐴𝑉𝐷𝑡−1  +  𝛽2𝐸𝑄𝑡  +   𝛽3𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆𝑡  +   𝛽4𝐵𝐶𝐼𝑡  +   𝛽5𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡  +  𝛽6𝐹𝑇𝑆𝐸𝑡
+   𝛽7𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡 
Coefficient estimates of Model 0 are given in Table 2. The significant coefficient loading 
for NAVD (-1) indicate a positive serial autocorrelation in the movement of NAVD. There 
are weak evidences to support the Rational Explanations and the Noise Trader 
Explanations. Specifically, both TRANS and BIC are not significant at the 5% level. These 
results serve to highlight the inadequacies of the two existing explanations. 
Table 2. Estimation Results of Model 0 (Dependent variable: NAVD) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. t-Statistic Prob. 
NAVD(-1) 0.9200 0.0279 32.9796 0.0000 
EQ 1.58E-05 8.14E-06 1.9464 0.0532 
TRANS 0.0089 0.0194 0.4610 0.6454 
BCI -0.0758 0.2973 -0.2551 0.7990 
INT -0.2226 0.2216 -1.0045 0.3165 
FTSE 0.6761 0.0719 9.4014 0.0000 
GDP -0.8570 1.3244 -0.6471 0.5184 
C 0.0690 0.3007 0.2295 0.8187 
R2 0.9231 
 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.9439 
Adjusted R2 0.9200 
 
White test: F-stat 1.7265 
F-stat 293.3373 
 
Prob(F-stat) 0.0138 
Prob(F-stat) 0.0000    
 
Baseline VAR Model (Model 1) 
Our first improvement to the benchmark model is an initial VAR model specification, 
which extends the variables used by Clayton and MacKinnon (2002) to include lagged 
NAV growth and the reaction to series of above average NAV growth, in a form that 
reflects the potential feedback relationships between the public and private markets.  
[
𝑁𝐴𝑉𝐷𝑡
𝑁𝐴𝑉𝐺𝑡
] =  [
𝑐𝐷
𝑐𝐺
] + [
𝐴𝐷,𝐷 𝐴𝐷,𝐶
𝐴𝐺.𝐷 𝐴𝐺,𝐶
] [
𝑁𝐴𝑉𝐷𝑡−1
𝑁𝐴𝑉𝐺𝑡−1
] +  + [
𝛽𝐷,1
𝛽𝐺,1
] [𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑉𝐸 ∗ 𝑁𝐴𝑉𝐺𝑡−1]  + [
𝛽𝐷,2
𝛽𝐺,2
] [𝐸𝑄]  
+ [
𝛽𝐷,3
𝛽𝐺,3
] [𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆]  +  [
𝛽𝐷,4
𝛽G,4
] [𝐵𝐶𝐼]  +  [
𝛽𝐷,5
𝛽𝐺,5
] [𝐼𝑁𝑇]  +  [
𝛽𝐷,6
𝛽𝐺,6
] [𝐹𝑇𝑆𝐸]
+ [
𝛽𝐷,7
𝛽𝐺,7
] [𝐺𝐷𝑃] + [
𝛽𝐷,8
𝛽𝐺,8
] [𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑇𝑡−1] +  [
𝑒𝐷,𝑡
𝑒𝐺,𝑡
] 
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We labelled this model as Model 1 and present the estimation results in the second 
column of Table 3.  The lagged NAV growth variable ( NAVDt−1 ) is included to test 
Hypothesis I, and the interaction term (ABOVE ∗ NAVGt−1) for the test of Hypothesis II. The 
coefficients for both variables show the hypothesised sign. However, neither term is 
significant. In addition, despite a high R2, residual plots reveal a poor fit of the model 
during the middle portion of the sample period, seemingly coinciding with the Global 
Financial Crisis (see Figure 2).  We subsequently modify the specification of Model 1 to 
incorporate this factor.  
Figure 2. NAVD and NAVG Residuals from Model 1  
 
VAR with Crisis Indicator (Model 2) 
Based on a visual inspection of the data (Figure 1) and residuals (Figure 2), a dummy 
variable CRISIS is defined for the Global Financial Crisis period from January 2007 to 
April 2009. Interaction terms with CRISIS are also included in Model 2 to allow for 
different responses to NAV growth during this period. The estimation results of this 
model can be found in the third column in Table 3. 
The negative coefficient for the lagged NAV growth variable in the estimation of Model 2 
indicates underreaction; the model predicts a larger NAV discount (i.e. more negative) 
following an increase in NAV, which is interpreted as reflecting an increased divergence 
between the public and private valuations due to a subdued response in the stock market 
valuation. In contrast, the interaction term ABOVE ∗ NAVGt−1 , which represents the 
marginal response to NAV growth information following a series of above average growth, 
displays a positive coefficient. This weakly significant coefficient implies that the model 
predicts overreaction to information following a perceived pattern in earlier growth. 
These findings provide support for Hypothesis I and Hypothesis II respectively. 
Furthermore, the total effect of NAV growth on NAV discount when two previous growths 
are above average is estimated to be positive (i.e., the overall effect is 0.9121 - 0.8013 = 
0.1108). 
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Table 3. Estimation Results of Models 1 - 4 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable NAVD NAVG NAVD NAVG NAVD NAVG NAVD NAVG 
NAVD(-1) 
0.8898 a 0.0634 a 0.9075 a 0.0748 a 0.9049 a 0.0786 a 0.9126 a 0.0749 a 
[25.7794] [3.5878] [25.7641] [4.0765] [25.44] [4.3411] [25.3636] [4.1423] 
NAVG(-1) 
-0.1881 0.1873 b -0.8013 b 0.3338 c -0.1645 0.2116 -0.1552 0.1818 
[-1.1458] [2.2286] [-2.2737] [1.8183] [-0.1856] [0.4688] [-0.1751] [0.4084] 
ABOVE* 
NAVG(-1) 
0.4325 0.3469 0.9121 0.1156 0.3524 0.2282 0.5432 -0.1367 
[0.9401] [1.4732] [1.6069] [0.3910] [0.3855] [0.4900] [0.5608] [-0.2809] 
CRISIS* 
NAVG(-1) 
  0.6817 c -0.1826 -0.4019 -0.3904 -0.3785 -0.4056 
  [1.8667] [-0.9599] [-0.4357] [-0.8309] [-0.4105] [-0.8758] 
CRISIS * 
ABOVE* 
NAVG(-1) 
  -4.6141 a -1.2846 -3.4850 c -1.0930 -3.3270 b -1.1937 
  [-2.9776] [-1.5914] [-1.9586] [-1.2062] [-1.8674] [-1.3341] 
BELOW* 
NAVG(-1) 
    -0.7947 0.1341 -0.7065 0.0545 
    [-0.8001] [0.2651] [-0.7102] [0.1091] 
CRISIS * 
BELOW* 
NAVG(-1) 
    1.5275 0.4421 1.4737 0.5042 
    [1.4982] [0.8514] [1.4445] [0.9841] 
OPT* 
BELOW* 
NAVG(-1) 
      -1.4386 0.8863 
      [-1.4597] [1.7905] 
PESS* 
ABOVE* 
NAVG(-1) 
      -0.2795 0.6762 b 
      [-0.4386] [2.1125] 
EQ 
1.3e-8 b -6.8e-9 b 1.5e-8 a -5.9e-9 c 1.3e-8 b -7.5e-9 a 1.2e-8 c -6.2e-9 b 
[2.0865] [-2.1413] [2.4315] [-1.8668] [2.0888] [-2.4338] [1.873] [-2.0017] 
TRANS 
0.0098 -0.0053 0.0021 -0.0044 0.0049 -0.0030 0.0053 -0.0019 
[0.4768] [-0.503] [0.1045] [-0.4200] [0.2439] [-0.2982] [0.2653] [-0.193] 
BCI 
0.1376 0.3847 b 0.3427 0.3808 b 0.3802 0.3352 c 0.1515 0.6099 a 
[0.4068] [2.2218] [1.0138] [2.1628] [1.0936] [1.8932] [0.3707] [2.9718] 
INT 
-0.2939 0.0668 -0.0089 0.1720 0.0156 0.2084 -0.0226 0.2355 c 
[-1.1218] [0.4981] [-0.0319] [1.1902] [0.0566] [1.4897] [-0.0819] [1.7000] 
FTSE 
0.6667 a 0.0412 0.6525 a 0.0509 0.6052 a 0.0105 0.6180 a -0.0007 
[9.2756] [1.1211] [9.1558] [1.3716] [8.2559] [0.2813] [8.369] [-0.0188] 
GDP 
-0.3407 1.8612 a -0.4674 1.9500 a -1.0527 1.4505 a -1.2576 1.5508 a 
[-0.3633] [3.8763] [-0.5069] [4.059] [-1.1139] [3.0142] [-1.3155] [3.2299] 
REIT(-1) 
0.0839 -0.0069 0.0542 -0.0114 0.0315 -0.0307 0.0316 -0.0302 
[1.6183] [-0.2583] [1.0543] [-0.4258] [0.6103] [-1.1697] [0.6119] [-1.1667] 
C 
-0.1494 -0.3843 b -0.3602 -0.3820 b -0.3967 -0.3341 c -0.1655 -0.6095 a 
[-0.4373] [-2.1976] [-1.0546] [-2.1471] [-1.1281] [-1.8657] [-0.4015] [-2.9442] 
Adj. R2 0.9221 0.5014 0.9260 0.5090 0.9282 0.5452 0.9283 0.5581 
F-stat 201.0856 17.9916 177.1096 15.5987 157.1299 15.4719 137.7686 14.3409 
Residual 
serial 
correlation:  
LM test p-value LM test p-value LM test p-value LM test p-value 
6.0089 0.1985 6.6897 0.1532 5.1061 0.2766 5.0628 0.2809 
Note: number in [ ] shows the t-statistic for each coefficient. 
a 1% significance level, b 5% significance level, c 10% significance level 
The optimal lag period is selected according to VAR lag selection criteria. LM tests report no autocorrelation issues 
for all models. 
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The crisis dummy variable adds another dimension to the findings. The interaction term, 
which represents the marginal effect of past NAV growth during the crisis, displays a 
positive coefficient. As above, the positive coefficient is interpreted as indicating 
overreaction to growth information during this period.  
An additional interaction term, CRISIS ∗ ABOVE ∗ NAVGt−1, tests for consistency in the 
reaction to above average growth patterns during the crisis. The significant negative 
coefficient recorded for the interaction term is in contrast to the results for ABOVE ∗
NAVGt−1. The result suggests a prediction that the response to positive trends in NAV 
growth is affected by the crisis, such that the public market displays a significantly 
negative response (i.e., -4.616+0.9121=-3.7039) to rising trend in NAV growth in this 
period, suggesting a underreaction, and then NAV discounts widen substantially.   
Our finding is largely in line with existing literature. Easterwood and Nutt (1999)’s 
generalised optimism concept provides the initial impetus for the focus on series of above 
average growth information. They contend that investors have a tendency to show 
greater sensitivity to positive information and are less likely to acknowledge negative 
information. More recently, it has been suggested that overreaction on the up-side may 
be a rational response (Gu & Xue, 2007). Clatworthy, Peel, and Pope (2012) find evidence 
for asymmetry in the loss functions of stock market analysts and suggest that the lower 
costs of making positive errors results in more analysts generating optimistic forecasts. 
To the extent that the optimistic analyst forecasts influence the behavior of investors, an 
up-side bias in analyst forecasts may also lead to overreaction to positive news in the 
market, consistent with the findings of Model 2.  
In addition to the main findings regarding the hypotheses under investigation, the model 
specification generates a number of other results that are consistent with existing 
literature. As expected, in the NAV discount equation, the lagged term is highly significant, 
representing serial correlation in the series.  The model also predicts that the sentiment 
variable (i.e., BCI) exhibits a significant relationship with the NAV growth, which is 
interpreted as reflecting the greater sensitivity of the public market valuation to market 
sentiment. The positive coefficient suggests, an increase in market sentiment is predicted 
to lead to a greater increase in the public market valuation. This suggests a role for 
economy-wide sentiment different from the irrational behaviors implied by the 
hypotheses.  
The results of Model 2 thus appear to provide broad support for the adoption of specific 
behavioral biases in NAV discount models. Our hypotheses, predicting underreaction to 
isolated information (Hypothesis I) and overreaction to positive momentum, i.e. 
consecutive past growths (Hypothesis II), are both supported.  In the following section, 
we also investigate two alternative behavioural explanations that may potentially 
improve the explanatory power of Model 2.  
6. Alternative Behavioral Explanations 
Model 2 focuses on testing overreaction to series of above average NAV growth. However, 
close examination of the literature reveals mixed results as to whether overreaction 
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should be more pronounced to negative or positive information.  Stressful situations 
often trigger coping strategies and ‘primitive methods of expression’, providing scope for 
heuristics and myopic behavior during downturns. More recent explanations for 
overreaction to negative news emphasise the role of reference points. This argument 
begins by assuming individuals are naturally optimistic, holding a positive reference 
point. It follows that when negative news arrives, as its distance is further from the 
reference point than positive news of the same magnitude, it appears worse and attracts 
an extreme response (Soroka, 2006). Aversion to loss provides a further explanation, 
which is supported by the consumption dynamics observed in the macro economy.  
A. S. Ahmed, Zhang, and Lobo (2000) attempt to replicate the conclusions of Easterwood 
and Nutt (1999) and identify significant instability in the results, casting doubt on the 
original research. Overreaction to negative news also seems to be a feature of other 
national stock markets (A. Ahmed & Skerratt, 2010). The peculiar characteristics of 
property companies relative to the rest of the stock market might provide further support 
for a prediction that overreaction would be more extreme to negative information. The 
high debt capacity and REIT pay out regulations, which result in a low free cash flow, are 
among the factors that lead public real estate companies, on average, to be highly levered 
(Yang, Zhou, & Leung, 2012). The reduced liquidity, increased likelihood of default, and 
possibility of fire sales, suggest high gearing may increase investor aversion to negative 
information.  
Model 3 shows the results of an extension to account for an asymmetric response to good 
and bad news. The extension is made by including an additional dummy variable, BELOW, 
to enable a comparison between responses to series of high or low NAV growth 
information. Mimicking the approach taken to represent positive trends, the dummy 
variable is defined to represent periods in which the two prior periods show below 
average growth. The estimation results of Model 3 is given in the fourth column in Table 
3.  However, the coefficient of BELOW∗ NAVGt−1  and CRISIS ∗ BELOW ∗ NAVGt−1  are 
insignificant. It follows that the results appear to support the original model specification 
(i.e., Model 2), which focused on investigating overreaction to series of above average 
growth information.  
A further possible nuance in the relationship is related to the concept of cognitive 
dissonance (Festinger, 1962).  Antoniou, Doukas, and Subrahmanyam (2013) suggest 
that the severity of behavioral biases is related to the broader economic sentiment. They 
argue that a combination of contradictory information has the effect of muting behavioral 
biases; if information is received contrary to the sentiment held at the time, it will receive 
less attention and underreaction is more likely to be observed. 
We estimate Model 4 to incorporate the effect of cognitive dissonance. Two additional 
dummy variables are defined to reflect categories of investor sentiment. Investors are 
categorised as pessimistic (PESS) when the business confidence index value is in the 
lower quartile of the series and optimistic (OPT) when business confidence is recorded 
in the upper quartile. The investor sentiment categories are interacted with the opposing 
trend variable for NAV growth information; the pessimistic variable is interacted with the 
above average run of NAV growth and the optimistic variable is interacted with the below 
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average run of NAV growth. The explanation of Antoniou et al. (2013) suggest that 
underreaction is expected to be most pronounced during optimistic conditions due to 
limited arbitrage activity as a result of increased costs of short selling. However, the 
coefficient estimate of  OPT ∗ BELOW ∗ NAVGt−1  is insignificant. This alternative 
explanation is not supported by our data.   
7. Conclusions 
Through the adoption of an explicit behavioral approach to the NAV discount model, this 
paper contributes to the explanations for the NAV discount puzzle. Using EPRA/NAREIT 
UK data between 2002 and 2017, our analysis suggests causality from information in 
private real estate market (NAV growth) to public real estate market (NAV discount). 
Evidence is found for biased reactions of public market to fundamental information in the 
private market, i.e., negative causality of NAV growth highlights underreaction to isolated 
information and implication of dummy variable and their interaction demonstrate 
overreaction to series of good news.  
In addition to its contribution to the NAV discount literature, the findings of this paper 
have broader implications. The bursting of the property market bubble during the Global 
Financial Crisis is a dramatic illustration of the impact of real estate investor behavior on 
the wider economy. It follows that how to dissolve real estate bubbles in the future is of 
grave concern to policy makers. This paper highlights the significant challenges faced by 
those designing policy for such a complex market. It is often suggested that improving 
information available to investors would reduce the tendency for prices to diverge from 
fundamentals (Graff & Young, 1997). However, the discussion in this paper suggests that 
such a strategy may be misguided if an overwhelming volume of information serves to 
promote heuristics that contribute to market distortions. Furthermore, the findings 
suggest that biases tie together the public and private market and that the feedback 
effects from each market may perpetuate cyclical tendencies. 
There is much scope for more detailed research of the market and its nuances. For 
instance, there has been some indication that the public real estate market might be 
considered in terms of liquidity classes, in order to improve understanding of movements 
of capital among REITs in accordance with the ‘flight to liquidity theory’ (P. K. Das, J. 
Freybote, & G. Marcato, 2015). Sectors of the US market (i.e. apartment, retail, office) have 
also been considered to display different public/private market behaviors (Hoesli, 
Oikarinen, & Serrano, 2015), but this is yet to be considered for the UK. Such work may 
be followed by research investigating whether the results can be replicated in overseas 
markets, where cultural factors may mitigate or exaggerate the existence of certain biases. 
While research in this area is still emerging, the fundamental insight is the emphasis that 
investors do not operate in isolation, but rather are part of the broader real estate system, 
engaging with the other sides of the market and market participants. The impossibility of 
isolating one market from another seems to present the opportunity for the transmission 
of information and sentiment to operate in all manner of directions.  
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